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Why are liberal rights and Islamic law understood in binary and exclusivist
terms at some moments, but not others? In this study, I trace when, why, and
how an Islamic law versus liberal rights binary emerged in Malaysian political
discourse and popular legal consciousness. I find that Malaysian legal institu-
tions were hardwired to produce vexing legal questions, which competing
groups of activists transformed into compelling narratives of injustice. By
tracing the development of this spectacle in the courtroom and beyond, I show
how the dueling binaries of liberal rights versus Islamic law, individual rights
versus collective rights, and secularism versus religion were contingent on
institutional design and political agency, rather than irreconcilable tensions
between liberal rights and the Islamic legal tradition in some intrinsic sense.
More broadly, the research contributes to our understanding of how popular
legal consciousness is shaped by legal mobilization and countermobilization
beyond the court of law.
Malaysian political life is increasingly polarized between activ-
ists who position themselves as defenders of secularism and liberal
rights on the one hand, and those who position themselves as
guardians of Islam and Islamic law on the other. Although tensions
between these groups have been rising for over three decades,
conflict has been exacerbated by a series of controversial court cases
that pit the jurisdiction of the shariah courts against the jurisdiction
of the civil courts. Increasingly, Malaysians are told by secularists
and religious conservatives alike that Islamic law and liberal rights
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are incompatible and that they must therefore stand for one or the
other.
This binary understanding of Islamic law and liberal rights is
not unique to Malaysia. A similar discourse is present, in different
shades and to varying degrees, in other Muslim-majority countries.
But the mere fact that public discourse varies so considerably across
time and place suggests that these tensions are contingent on insti-
tutional and political circumstances rather than irreconcilable dif-
ferences between the Islamic legal tradition and liberal rights in an
intrinsic sense.1 Acknowledging the politically constructed nature
of this binary is not to minimize its significance. Indeed, this con-
struction has profound implications. It directly shapes the terms
of debate around a host of political issues, including the rights of
women and religious minorities, and the perennial struggle over
religious authority—that is, who speaks for Islam.
This study examines the construction of this binary in Malaysia
by tracing a series of divisive court cases that concerned the juris-
diction of the Malaysian shariah courts vis-à-vis the civil courts over
the last decade. Each of the cases—dealing with issues of religious
conversion, divorce, and child custody—was significant in a legal
sense, but I argue that their greatest collective impact was on
political discourse and popular legal consciousness. Together, the
cases generated a flood of media coverage and became the focal
point for public debates over the secular versus religious founda-
tions of the state, the rights of non-Muslim citizens, and individual
versus collective rights.
Ironically, the crux of each case had little to do with the Islamic
legal tradition. Instead, matters related to court jurisdiction, rules
of standing, and other features of Malaysian judicial process were at
issue. Each case began far from the media spotlight and concerned
technical issues of jurisdiction between the two tracks of the Malay-
sian judiciary. But political activists raised the profile of the cases,
framed their significance in the media, and situated their meanings
in popular consciousness. Because the vast majority of the public
does not have formal legal training, working knowledge of Islamic
jurisprudence, or the opportunity to examine the intricacies of
court rulings, these alternate framings had a powerful effect on the
direction of public discourse.
1 Numerous studies establish that there is no necessary or essential tension between
the Islamic legal tradition and contemporary notions of liberal rights (Abou El Fadl 2004;
Ali 2000; Baderin 2003; Kamali 2008; March 2009; Sachedina 2009). This is despite the fact
that exclusivist claims are also made from within the Islamic legal tradition. The relation-
ship between the Islamic legal tradition and liberal rights is therefore best understood as
indeterminate and contested, but not fundamentally incompatible.
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These dynamics are certainly not unique to Malaysian politics
and society. As in any other setting, popular understandings of legal
issues are mediated by prior political beliefs, the social networks in
which individuals are situated, the frames of understanding crafted
by political spokespersons, and media representations (Ewick &
Silbey 1998; Haltom & McCann 2004; Merry 1990; Walsh 2004). It
is the complexity of history, law, and, in this case, the Islamic legal
tradition that gives political activists a great deal of power to define
the terms of debate, and in so doing, make complicated issues
legible for a popular audience. This sort of complexity also makes
competing narratives inevitable. As Merry notes in her seminal
study of legal consciousness, “the same event, person, action, and so
forth can be named and interpreted in very different ways. The
naming . . . is therefore an act of power. Each naming points to a
solution” (1990: 111).
In the cases examined here, competing groups of lawyers,
judges, politicians, media outlets, and civil society groups shaped
public discourse along two competing frames. The first frame,
advanced by liberal rights activists, characterized the cases as grave
challenges to the authority and position of the civil courts, which
were cast as a last bastion for the protection of liberal rights vis-à-vis
the dakwah (religious revival) movement.2 The second frame, put
forward by conservative groups, was a mirror image of the first.
Conservatives claimed that the cases represented grave threats to
the authority and position of the shariah courts, which were cast as
the last bastion of religious law vis-à-vis the secular state. These
alternate “injustice frames” (Gamson 1992) were deployed in the
public sphere and resonated with different constituencies. Ironi-
cally, neither side sustained the binary alone. As with the construc-
tion of any political spectacle, each side derived legitimacy,
purpose, and power from their oppositional stance toward the
other (Edelman 1988). Liberal rights activists rallied supporters,
both domestically and internationally, by sounding the alarm that
liberal rights were under siege and that Malaysia was on the way to
becoming an Islamic state. On the other side of the divide, conser-
vative organizations rallied support by contending that liberal
rights groups wished to undermine the autonomy of the shariah
courts and that they worked in cooperation with powerful foreign
agents intent on weakening Islam.3 Perhaps not surprisingly, these
2 The term dakwah comes from the Arabic “da‘wah,” which carries the literal meaning
of “making an invitation.” In Islamic theology, da‘wah is the practice of inviting people to
dedicate themselves to a deeper level of piety. The term is used in contemporary Malaysian
politics to stand in for the various manifestations, both social and political, of the piety
movement.
3 The dynamic interaction of liberal rights mobilization and conservative counter-
mobilization remains relatively understudied. Prominent research in the American context
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frames proved effective because they resonated with a broader
constellation of political struggles and long-standing grievances at
the intersection of race, religion, and access to state resources.
In the analysis that follows, I trace the life cycle of these legal
disputes to provide an empirically grounded study of how this
binary is continually reinscribed in the Malaysian public imagina-
tion. I begin with a brief overview of how law and legal institutions
are configured in Malaysia, focusing on the bifurcation of judicial
institutions into civil and shariah court tracks. These institutional
formations are products of the colonial era and both are distinctly
secular formations of the modern state. Part two examines how
these institutional configurations generated a series of legal dis-
putes centered on the jurisdiction of the shariah courts vis-à-vis the
civil courts. Part three traces how these cases provided a focal point
for political mobilization and the construction of an Islamic law
versus liberal rights binary in public discourse. Finally, interviews
and survey data are used to examine how the cases were under-
stood by the general public.
Institutional Roots of the Problem
Islam spread through the Malay Peninsula beginning in the
fourteenth century, but the introduction of Islamic law in its
present, institutionalized form is a far more recent development.4
This is important to highlight at the outset because a central argu-
ment of this study is that the legal conundrums concerning shariah
and civil court jurisdictions are not the result of an essential incom-
patibility between the Islamic legal tradition and liberal rights.
Rather, I argue that they are the product of the specific ways that
legal institutions were introduced in British Malaya, and later con-
figured vis-à-vis one another in the independence period.
To the extent that Islamic law was practiced in the precolonial
Malay Peninsula, it was socially embedded and marked by tremen-
dous variability across time and place (Horowitz 1994). Religious
leaders were not part of a centralized state apparatus.5 Instead,
includes Dudas (2008), Goldberg-Hiller (2004), and Teles (2010), but there are even fewer
studies from a law and society perspective that examine the dialectics of mobilization and
countermobilization outside the North American context.
4 “Despite the references to Islamic law that exist in fifteenth-century texts such as the
Undang-Undang Melaka, there is little if any solid evidence to indicate widespread knowl-
edge or implementation of such laws in the Malay Peninsula prior to the nineteenth
century” (Peletz 2002: 62). Also see Horowitz (1994).
5 “In the realm of religious belief, as in that of political organization, the Malay state as
a rule lacked the resources necessary for centralization of authority” (Roff 1967: 67).
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they were “members of village communities who, for reasons of
exceptional piety or other ability, had been chosen by the commu-
nity to act as imam of the local mosque . . .” (Roff 1967: 67). As in
other Muslim-majority areas (Hallaq 2009), the colonial period
marked a key turning point for the institutionalization and central-
ization of religious authority (Hooker 1975; Horowitz 1994; Hussin
2007; Moustafa 2013a; Roff 1967).
Beginning with the Treaty of Pangkor in 1874, the British first
established its system of “indirect rule” in the state of Perak.6 Local
rulers were left to oversee matters related to religion and custom
(adat) while English law governed all other aspects of commercial
and criminal law. A Muslim Marriage Enactment was issued to
regulate Muslim family law in the Straits Settlements in 1880 and
separate courts were established a decade later with jurisdiction
limited to Muslim family law matters and decisions subject to review
by the High Courts (Horowitz 1994: 256).
The term “Anglo-Muslim law” characterized this peculiar legal
construct.7 The law was “Anglo” in the sense that the concepts,
categories, and modes of analysis followed English common law,
and it was “Muslim” in the sense that it was applied to Muslims.
Anglo-Muslim law incorporated some select fragments of fiqh
(classical Islamic jurisprudence), but it carried epistemological
assumptions and organizing principles that were entirely distinct
from usul al-fiqh, the legal method undergirding classical Islamic
jurisprudence (Moustafa 2013b).8 Hooker explains that “. . . the
classical syarî’ah is not the operative law and has not been since
the colonial period. ‘Islamic law’ is really Anglo-Muslim law; that is,
the law that the state makes applicable to Muslims” (2004: 218).
By the beginning of the twentieth century, “a classically-trained
Islamic jurist would be at a complete loss with this Anglo-Muslim
law” whereas “a common lawyer with no knowledge of Islam would
be perfectly comfortable” (Hooker 2004: 218).
6 Prior to this, the British gained direct control of the port cities of Penang (1786),
Singapore (1819), and Malacca (1824) for the purpose of trade and commerce. Together,
the three outposts formed the Straits Settlements, which were later ruled directly as a
Crown colony beginning in 1867. Separately, Britain established protectorates in what
would come to be known as the Federated Malay States of Perak, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang,
and Selangor, and the Unfederated Malay States of Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and
Terengganu.
7 Just as “Anglo-Muslim” law was applied to Muslim subjects, “Anglo-Hindu,” “Chinese
customary law,” and other codes were applied to various religious and ethnic communities.
For more on Anglo-Hindu and Chinese customary law in British Malaya, see Hooker (1975:
58–84; 158–81) and Siraj (1994).
8 Usul al-fiqh carries the literal meaning “origins of the law” or “roots of the law” but
it also carries the meaning “principles of understanding” or “Islamic legal theory.” See
Hallaq (2009) for more on usul al-fiqh and its subversion by modern state law.
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Two aspects of these institutional changes are especially note-
worthy for our purpose. First, Islamic law was transformed from
being pluralistic and socially embedded to being codified and insti-
tutionalized (Horowitz 1994; Hussin 2007; Moustafa 2013b; Roff
1967). Islamic law was thus “secularized” in the sense that it became
an instrument of the modern, regulatory state (Asad 2003). A
second noteworthy aspect of this transformation is that the legal
system was bifurcated into parallel jurisdictions, a configuration
that would later be entrenched in the Federal Constitution.
Concurrent with these institutional transformations were pro-
found demographic changes and the institutionalization of “race”9
as a salient category of governance.10 Laborers were brought from
China by the hundreds of thousands to work in the tin industry and
the British turned to India for cheap labor to run vast rubber
plantations.11 Colonial policy tended to overlook the tremendous
ethnic and linguistic diversity internal to these groupings and eco-
nomic roles were assigned according to race (Hirschman 1986:
353).12 As in other times and places, the legal construction of racial
boundaries tended to serve economic and political objectives
(Mamdani 2012; Mawani 2009). For example, the Malay Reserva-
tions Act set land aside for Malays to use in “traditional” agricul-
tural pursuits, first among them rice cultivation. Although the
Reservations Act was made in the name of preserving “the Malay
way of life,” the reality had more to do with limiting the expansion
of Chinese business interests, barring Malays from competing in
9 I use the term “race” rather than “ethnicity” for two reasons. First, race is the term
that is used among Malaysians themselves. But I also find myself in agreement with an
important analytic distinction made by Bashi (1998) and Gomez (2010). They explain that
“although both race and ethnicity are about socially constructed group difference in society,
race is always about hierarchical social difference . . .” (Gomez 2010: 490). In other words,
the term “race” captures a power dimension that tends to fall out of the picture in
discussions of “ethnicity.” In using the term race, I subscribe to the three components of the
constructionist view outlined by Gomez (2010: 491): (1) a biological basis for race is rejected;
(2) race is viewed as a social construct that changes along with political, economic, and
other context; and (3) the view that “although race is socially constructed . . . [it] has real
consequences.”
10 Parts of the Malay Peninsula were already multiethnic by the time the British
arrived, but economic forces accelerated the rate of demographic change beginning in the
middle of the nineteenth century.
11 While most accounts of migration to the Malay Peninsula focus on the influx of
Chinese and Indian workers, there was also significant Malay migration through this
period. Andaya and Andaya (2001: 184) report that by 1931 nearly half of Malays in the
former protectorates were either first-generation arrivals from the Netherlands East Indies
or descendants of Indonesian migrants who had arrived after 1891. And just as Chinese
and Indian migrants were a mix of various ethnic and linguistic groups, the “Malay”
community was similarly diverse.
12 Particularly revealing is how census categories merged over time, both during the
colonial era and after, reflecting (and reinforcing) new political and social categories
(Hirschman 1986).
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the lucrative rubber industry, and preserving adequate food sup-
plies in the colony. The official and unofficial basis for the legal
definition of “Malay” was thus context specific and ultimately short
lived, but the legal category lived on and acquired increasing politi-
cal salience as Malays were granted exclusive access to positions
in the civil service, special business permits, government scholar-
ships, and lucrative government contracts under the late colonial
administration.
Equally noteworthy for our purpose is how the racial category
of “Malay” was legally fused with the religious designation, Muslim.
The Malay Reservations Act defined a Malay as “any person
belonging to the ‘Malayan race’ who habitually spoke Malay . . . and
who professed Islam” (Andaya & Andaya 2001: 183). The fused
racial/religious legal category, first borne in the colonial era,
remains virtually unchanged until the present day, as enshrined in
Article 160 (2) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution. Religious
categories are thus defined and regulated by state law, and are
thoroughly intertwined with the politics of race and access to state
resources.13
Shariah versus Civil Court Jurisdictions
The bifurcation of the judicial system into separate tracks con-
tinued after independence in 1957. The federal civil courts contin-
ued to administer commercial, criminal, and administrative law in
addition to personal status law for non-Muslims. State-level Muslim
Courts (rebranded “Shariah Courts” in 1976) exercised jurisdiction
over Muslims in the area of personal status law and certain defined
aspects of criminal law.
Shariah court rulings were subject to review until the govern-
ment amended the Federal Constitution in 1988.
This amendment, Article 121 (1A), should be understood in the
broader context of the dakwah (religious revival) movement that
had begun a decade earlier. The ruling party, the United Malays
National Organization (UMNO), sought to bolster its religious
13 The Malay/non-Malay cleavage largely maps onto the Muslim/non-Muslim cleavage.
The Malay community, which is constitutionally defined as Muslim, constitutes just over
half of Malaysia’s total population of 28 million. The second largest ethnic group is Chinese,
standing at approximately 26 percent of the total population. Most ethnic Chinese identify
as Buddhist (76 percent), with substantial numbers identifying as Taoist (11 percent) and
Christian (10 percent). The ethnic Indian community stands at approximately eight
percent of the total population and is also religiously diverse, with most ethnic Indians
following Hinduism (85 percent), and a significant number practicing Christianity (7.7
percent) and Islam (3.8 percent). The overall breakdown of the population according to
religion is approximately 60 percent Muslim, 19 percent Buddhist, nine percent Christian,
six percent Hindu, and five percent of other faiths.
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credentials vis-à-vis the dakwah movement in general, and in rela-
tion to the leading Islamist opposition party, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia
(PAS) in particular. UMNO’s “Islamization” program was manifest
beginning in the mid-1970s, but accelerated under the leadership
of Mahathir Mohammad (1981–2003). During his 22 years as Prime
Minister, Mahathir harnessed the legitimizing power of Islamic
symbolism and discourse (Liow 2009; Nasr 2001). State-sponsored
religious institutions were established, primary and secondary edu-
cation curricula were revised to include more material on Islamic
civilization, and radio and television content followed suit (Barr &
Govindasamy 2010; Camroux 1996). But it was in the field of law
and legal institutions that the most consequential innovations were
made (Moustafa 2013b). As one of several initiatives in this area, the
government formed a committee to examine “the unsatisfactory
position of the Shariah Courts . . . and suggest measures to be taken
to raise their status and position” (Ibrahim 2000: 136). One recom-
mendation of the committee was to oust the civil courts from
shariah court jurisdiction by way of a constitutional amendment.
Mahathir adopted the recommendation and proposed a constitu-
tional amendment declaring that the High Courts of the Federation
“shall have no jurisdiction in any respect of any matter within the
jurisdiction of the Shariah courts.”
Opening Parliamentary debate, Mahathir explained that the
amendment was necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the shariah
courts vis-à-vis the federal civil courts:
One thing that has brought about dissatisfaction among the
Islamic community in this country is the situation whereby any
civil court is able to change or cancel a decision made by the
Shariah court. For example, an incident happened where a
person who was unhappy with the decision of the Shariah court
regarding child custody brought her charges to the High Court
and won a different decision. The government feels that a situa-
tion like this affects the sovereignty of the Shariah court and the
execution of Shariah law among the Muslims of this country. It is
very important to secure the sovereignty of the Shariah court to
decide on matters involving its jurisdiction, what more if the
matter involves Shariah law. Therefore, it is suggested that
a new clause be added to Article 121, which is the Clause (1A)
stating that the courts mentioned in the Article do not have any
jurisdiction over any item of law under the control of the Shariah
Court.14
There is little evidence by way of newspaper coverage or other
primary source material to support Mahathir’s contention that civil
14 Minutes of the Dewan Rakyat, 17 March 1988, section 1364.
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court rulings had produced “a feeling of dissatisfaction among
Muslims in the country.” The civil courts rarely overturned shariah
court rulings, and in cases where they had, the rulings were not
covered extensively by the press.15 Media coverage of the amend-
ment’s passage was also surprisingly thin.16 As a result, Article 121
(1A) was incorporated into the Federal Constitution with little
Parliamentary debate and no popular awareness outside a small
number of lawmakers, legal scholars, and practitioners. Yet, as
we will see below, the amendment introduced profound legal
dilemmas.
Legal Conundrums
In theory, Article 121 (1A) of the Federal Constitution demar-
cated a clean division between the civil courts and the shariah
courts. Muslims would henceforth be exclusively subject to the
jurisdiction of the shariah courts in matters related to religion
while non-Muslims would remain subject to the jurisdiction of the
civil courts.17 In practice, however, dozens of cases presented
vexing legal questions. These cases—the “article 121 (1A) cases”—
generated enormous political controversy and became the focal
point for civil society mobilization once they came into public view.
Below I present three examples of such cases, each of which
became the object of heated political debate.18
Shamala v. Jeyaganesh
A case that commanded nationwide attention was Shamala v.
Jayaganesh. Shamala Sathiyaseelan and Jeyaganesh Mogarajah,
both Hindus, were married in 1998 according to the civil law
15 Malay language newspapers did not mention the four cases that were cited by
Ahmed Ibrahim as examples of civil court interference: Myriam v. Mohamed Ariff [1971] 1
MLJ 265; Boto’Binti Taha v. Jaafar Bin Muhamed [1985] 2 MLJ 98; Nafsiah v. Abdul Majid
[1969] 2 MLJ 174; and Roberts v. Ummi Kalthom [1966] 1 MLJ 163.
16 This was likely due to the fact that parliamentary debate was overshadowed by a
second constitutional amendment, introduced simultaneously, that weakened the indepen-
dence of the federal courts vis-à-vis the executive. Seven Democratic Action Party (DAP)
Members of Parliament were also held in detention at the time in the aftermath of
Operation Lalang, limiting debate of the amendment.
17 Schedule nine of the Federal Constitution sets out the areas of law that fall within the
jurisdiction of state-level shariah courts.
18 These three cases were selected because they represent the three distinct types of
Article 121 (1A) related conflicts that emerged following the 1988 constitutional amend-
ment. They were also among the most politicized cases once Article 121 (1A) cases entered
the public spotlight beginning in 2004.
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statute that governs marriages among non-Muslims in Malaysia.19
Four years later, Jeyaganesh converted to Islam and subsequently
converted their two children, ages two and four, to Islam without
his wife’s knowledge or consent. Shamala obtained an interim
custody order for the children from the civil courts, the appropriate
legal body for adjudicating family law disputes among non-
Muslims. However, shortly thereafter, the father secured an interim
custody order of his own from a shariah court on the grounds that
he and the children were now Muslim and therefore under the
jurisdiction of the shariah courts in matters of family law. The two
court orders came to opposite conclusions.
Shamala v. Jeyaganesh begged the question of which court had
the ultimate authority to determine the religious status and the
custody of the children. According to the law, the shariah courts
have jurisdiction over personal status questions involving individu-
als who are legally registered as Muslim. Moreover, Article 121 (1A)
of the Federal Constitution prevents the civil courts from reviewing
or overturning shariah court decisions.20 Yet, it was undeniable that
Shamala’s rights were harmed. Married to a Hindu according to
civil law, she now found herself in a custody battle that involved the
shariah courts.
In the High Court proceedings that ensued, Shamala sought a
court order declaring the conversions of the children null and void.
However, the judge denied her petition, ruling that:
by virtue of art. 121 (1A) of the Federal Constitution, the Shariah
Court is the qualified forum to determine the status of the two
minors. Only the Shariah Court has the legal expertise in hukum
syarak [shariah law] to determine whether the conversion of the
two minors is valid or not. Only the Shariah Court has the com-
petency and expertise to determine the said issue. (Shamala v.
Jeyaganesh 2004: 660)
The ruling put Shamala in a no-win situation. She had no remedy
in the civil courts, nor did she have legal standing in the shariah
courts because she was not a Muslim. Even if she had wished to
approach the shariah courts for relief, it was not an avenue open to
19 Act 164/1976, also known as the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976.
20 This is the standing interpretation provided by the Federal Court through case law.
In contrast, prominent liberal rights attorneys Malik Imtiaz and Shanmuga Kanesalingam
maintain that, if properly read, Article 121 (1A) should not preclude the civil courts from
reviewing shariah court rulings when fundamental liberties are in jeopardy. They argue
that the weakening of formal judicial independence made judges vulnerable to political
pressures, particularly when they are working on politically sensitive cases. According to
this view, the weak stance of the civil courts in cases involving Article 121 (1A) is ultimately
the result of political pressure and insufficient judicial independence rather than express
constitutional provisions. (Interviews with Shanmuga Kanesalingam, 9 July 2009, and
Malik Imtiaz, 5 November 2009).
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her. The presiding judge acknowledged the unsatisfactory result:
“What then is for her to do? The answer [is that] it is not for this
court to legislate and confer jurisdiction to the Civil Court but for
Parliament to provide the remedy” (2004: 649). Fearing that her
husband would deny her joint custody, Shamala moved to Australia
with the children, never to return.21 As we will soon see, Shamala v.
Jeyaganesh was the spark that ignited a full throttled campaign
between liberal and conservative activists.
Lina Joy v. Islamic Religious Council of the Federal Territories
Another controversial case that attracted national and interna-
tional attention was that of Lina Joy, a woman from a Malay Muslim
family who sought to change the religious designation on her
National Registration Identity Card in order to marry a non-
Muslim man.22 The National Registration Department (NRD)
refused to process Joy’s application without her first obtaining a
certificate from a shariah court validating her conversion. Rather
than pursuing this avenue, which had been an administrative dead
end for others before her, Joy initiated a lawsuit against the NRD
and the Religious Council of the Federal Territories in the civil
courts.
Joy pointed to Article 11 of the Malaysian Constitution, which
states (in part) that “Every person has the right to profess and
practice his religion. . . .” Joy argued that Article 11 gave her alone
the freedom to declare her religious status and that she had no
obligation to seek certification from a shariah court.23 The High
Court dismissed the petition based on the fact that Joy was a
registered Muslim and that conversion out of Islam was a legal
21 Shamala attempted to appeal the ruling, but the Federal Court dismissed the appeal
without considering the constitutional questions on the grounds that she was in contempt
of court for denying Jeyaganesh his visitation rights.
22 Lina Joy’s original name was Azlina bte Jailani. Prior to this case, Joy applied to
change her official name from Azlina bte Jailani (a Muslim name) to Lina Lelani (a
non-Muslim name) on her National Registration Identity Card so that she could marry a
non-Muslim man. While marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims is not permitted in
Malaysia, changing one’s name was a way for star-crossed lovers to circumvent the letter of
the law and have their marriages registered by the state. However, the National Registra-
tion Department (NRD), the administrative department charged with processing such
requests, rejected the application. Undeterred, Azlina applied once again for a name
change, this time to “Lina Joy.” The National Registration Department approved the
second name change request, but Joy’s replacement identity card recorded her religion as
“Islam.” The statement of official religion on the identity card was the result of a new
administrative procedure designed to close the loophole that had enabled Muslims to
effectively sidestep the state’s regulation of religion by way of a name change.
23 Joy’s attorneys challenged the constitutionality of Article 2 of the Administration
of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act of 1993 and related state enactments. They also
claimed that the Shariah Criminal Offences Act of 1997 and related State Enactments were
not applicable to the plaintiff who professes Christianity.
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matter that lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the shariah
courts based on Article 121 (1A) of the Federal Constitution. The
High Court also declared that Joy’s fundamental freedoms were
not violated if one understands that the true intent of Article 11 is
to protect the freedom of various religious communities to practice
their faith free of interference rather than for individuals to profess
and practice the religion of their choice.24 To support this interpre-
tation, Judge Faiza Tamby Chik pointed to other clauses in Article
11 of the Federal Constitution, including clause 3, which states:
“Every religious group has the right . . . to manage its own religious
affairs. . . .” The true meaning of freedom of religion, Judge Faiza
Tamby Chik argued, is that religious authorities must be left to
regulate their own internal matters without interference from the
state. According to the Court:
When a Muslim wishes to renounce/leave the religion of Islam, his
other rights and obligations as a Muslim will also be jeopardized
and this is an affair of Muslim [sic] falling under the first defen-
dant’s jurisdiction. . . . Even though the first part [of article 11]
provides that every person has the right to profess and practice
his religion, this does not mean that the plaintiff can hide behind
this provision without first settling the issue of renunciation of her
religion (Islam) with the religious authority which has the right to
manage its own religious affairs under art 11 (3) (a) of the FC. (Joy
v. Islamic Council of the Federal Territories 2004: 126)
The High Court’s ruling that Lina Joy must settle the matter with
a shariah court failed to account for a glaring lacuna in the law: The
Administration of Islamic Law Act contains provisions for register-
ing conversions into Islam, but not out of Islam.25 Others had pre-
viously sought legal recognition of their conversion by the shariah
courts, only to find that in most states the shariah courts do not
have administrative procedures for certifying conversion out of
Islam (Adil 2007a, 2007b).26
24 This decision departed from earlier rulings by the civil courts in Ng Wan Chan v.
Islamic Religious Council of the Federal Territories and in Dalip Kaur v. Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai
Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam. In both cases, decided in 1991, the civil courts took the position
that only issues expressly conferred to the jurisdiction of the shariah courts would remain
in their jurisdiction. This principle changed just prior to Joy v. Religious Council in a decision
involving a Sikh man (Soon Singh) who wished to change his religious designation after
having converted to Islam as a teenager. In this case, the civil courts adopted a new doctrine
of implied jurisdiction vis-à-vis the shariah courts, effectively providing the shariah courts
with exclusive jurisdiction over such matters.
25 The Administration of Islamic Law Act regulates the personal status law of Muslims
in the Federal Territories, which includes the capital city of Kuala Lumpur where Lina Joy
was a resident.
26 Six of Malaysia’s 13 states and the Federal Territories do not provide legal mecha-
nisms for state recognition of conversion out of Islam. Five other states criminalize conver-
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The ruling in April 2001 was not the final decision on the
matter. The case went to the Court of Appeal and later to the
Federal Court, the highest appellate court in Malaysia.27 Amicus
curiae briefs were submitted by nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) on both sides of the case. The Bar Council, HAKAM,
and the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity,
Hinduism, and Sikhism held watching briefs on behalf of Lina Joy,
while briefs from conservative Muslim organizations included
the Malaysian Islamic Student Youth Movement (ABIM), the
Muslim Lawyers Association, and the Shariah Lawyers Association
of Malaysia. In a split 2-1 Federal Court decision, Chief Justice
Ahmad Fairuz and Justice Alauddin affirmed the previous rulings.
The dissenting judgment from Richard Malanjum, on the other
hand, pointed to the gap in the law: “The insistence by NRD for a
certificate of apostasy from the Federal Territory Syariah Court or
any Islamic Authority was not only illegal but unreasonable. This
was because under the applicable law, the Syariah Court in the
Federal Territory has no statutory power to adjudicate on the issue
of apostasy.” By failing to attend to this lacuna, Joy v. Religious
Council of the Federal Territories did little to address the legal conun-
drum that lay at the heart of all prior conversion cases.28
Kaliammal Sinnasamy v. Islamic Religious Affairs Council of the
Federal Territories
The jurisdiction between the civil and shariah courts was also
complicated by the death of individuals with contested religious
affiliation. In these so-called “body-snatching” cases, state-level
Religious Councils take possession of the deceased for a Muslim
burial if they are registered as Muslim by the state. These situa-
tions stir particularly intense emotions if non-Muslim family
members are unaware of the conversion, or suspect that the con-
version was made under duress. In these situations, non-Muslim
family members sometimes litigate for the right to bury the
deceased.
A striking example of this type of dispute followed the death of
Moorthy Maniam, a Malaysian national hero who had climbed
sion. Only one state (Negeri Sembilan) provides a formal avenue for conversion out of
Islam, but the process is lengthy and requires mandatory counseling.
27 In a split 2-1 decision, Joy lost in the Court of Appeal (Lina Joy v Islamic Religious
Council of the Federal Territories 2005).
28 To be sure, the absence of a viable path to conversion out of Islam is not simply an
oversight in the law. Rather, it is a lacuna that persists by design, despite there being
divergent positions in the Islamic legal tradition itself. For more, see Saeed and Saeed
(2004).
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Mount Everest with a national team. Although Moorthy’s family
and the public at large knew him to be a practicing Hindu,
Moorthy’s wife, Kaliammal, was informed that her husband had
converted to Islam, requiring that he be provided with a Muslim
burial by the religious authorities.29 If Moorthy had converted to
Islam, it was not done publicly; Moorthy had carried out Hindu
rites in public just weeks before he fell into a coma. UponMoorthy’s
death on December 20, 2005, his widow filed a lawsuit to prevent
the Islamic Religious Affairs Council from taking her husband’s
body for burial. A hearing was scheduled for December 29, 2005,
but in the meantime the Islamic Religious Affairs Council applied
for and received an order from the Kuala Lumpur Shariah High
Court to release the body for a Muslim burial. The Shariah Court
order was served on the hospital, but the hospital director held the
body until the civil courts could review the matter. Radio, television,
and newspapers covered the unfolding drama intensively.
The High Court of Kuala Lumpur heard Kaliammal’s appeal
the following week, but the judge dismissed the suit on the
grounds that the federal civil courts did not have the competence
or the jurisdiction to decide on Moorthy’s religious status as a
result of Article 121 (1A). For all practical purposes, the High
Court’s dismissal denied Moorthy’s widow recourse to any legal
forum due to the fact that, as a non-Muslim, she did not have
standing in the shariah courts. Moorthy’s body was released to
the religious authorities and buried on the same day, enraging
the non-Muslim community.
These three cases illustrate the fact that any clean division
between the shariah and civil court jurisdictions proved extremely
illusive. Rather than simplifying jurisdiction, Article 121 (1A) pre-
sented new legal dilemmas. In cases concerning child custody when
one parent converts (Shamala v. Jeyaganesh), or in cases concerning
the right to convert out of Islam (Joy v. Islamic Religious Council), or
in cases concerning burial rites for those with contested religious
status (Kaliammal v. Islamic Religious Affairs Council), Article 121 (1A)
presented vexing legal conundrums for the Malaysian judiciary. It
bears repeating that these legal tensions were not rooted in the
classical Islamic legal tradition, but were instead the product of
codified state law and the institutional configuration of the civil
courts vis-à-vis the shariah courts. In other words, these legal
conundrums were the result of the institutional formations of the
modern state. Nonetheless, the significance and meaning of the
cases were framed in a very different manner.
29 Moorthy spent the last six weeks of his life in a coma. It was at this time that his wife
was informed of Moorthy’s alleged religious conversion.
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Constructing the Political Spectacle
It is not difficult to understand why the rulings roused deep
concern among secularists and non-Muslims. Each case provided a
clear example that the civil courts were beginning to cede broad
legal authority when issues around Islam were involved, even when
it meant trampling on individual rights enshrined in the Federal
Constitution and even when non-Muslims were involved. Within
the broad context of the dakwah movement over the preceding
three decades, liberal rights activists understood the rulings as the
failure of this last bastion of secular law vis-à-vis religious authori-
ties. But these cases evoked the worst fears among conservatives as
well. Each case was understood not as the tyranny of Islamic law or
as “creeping Islamization,” but rather as an attack on the autonomy
of the shariah courts. In the Lina Joy case, for example, the central
focus of conservative discourse concerned the implications of an
adverse ruling on the Muslim community’s ability to manage its
own religious affairs in multireligious Malaysia. If the civil courts
affirmed Joy’s individual right to freedom of religion, it would
essentially constitute a breakdown in the autonomy of the shariah
courts and a breach in the barrier that conservatives understood
Article 121 (1A) to guarantee.
Conservative activists argued that human rights instruments
are focused exclusively on the individual and, as such, they are
unable to accommodate communal understandings of rights when
they come in tension with individual rights claims.30 Prominent
Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) Parliament Member Dzulkifli
Ahmad lamented that liberal rights activists could view the cases
only from an individual rights perspective and not see that such
a framework necessarily undermines the collective right of the
Muslim community to govern its own affairs.31 For Dzulkifli and
others, adverse rulings in any of the cases involving Article 121 (1A)
would be tantamount to “abolishing and dismantling the Shariah
Court” (Ahmad 2007: 153). For conservatives, individual rights talk
is marked by an expansionist and even an “imperialist” orientation.
Just as discourse among liberal rights activists is marked by fear that
individual rights faced an imminent threat, a deep anxiety set in
among those who wished to protect what they viewed as the collec-
tive rights of the Muslim community.
30 This specific point was made by several prominent conservative NGO leaders in
personal interviews, including the head of Jamaah Islah Malaysia, Zaid Kamaruddin (Kuala
Lumpur, 25 June 2009) and the head of ABIM, Yusri Mohammad (Kuala Lumpur, 30 June
2009).
31 This view was summed up in the title of Dzulkifli Ahmed’s book on the topic, Blind
Spot (2007).
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Of course an understanding of the religious community as the
legitimate bearer of rights obfuscates the issue of how religious
authority was constructed in Malaysia in the first place. The legal
dilemmas concerning the authority and jurisdiction of the shariah
courts were not the result of an inherent or essential tension
between the Islamic legal tradition and individual rights. Rather,
these legal dilemmas were the result of the state’s specific formal-
ization and institutionalization of state law. The bifurcation of the
legal system into parallel jurisdictions had hardwired the legal
system to produce legal tensions. However, most Malaysians under-
stood these legal problems as the product of an essential incompat-
ibility between the requirements of civil law and the Islamic legal
tradition. This (mis)understanding was promoted by many political
activists who recognized that although legal battles are fought in the
court of law, more significant ideological struggles are won or lost in
the court of public opinion. Given the complexity and ambiguities
of the legal issues at stake, political entrepreneurs were able to
define the terms of debate and, in so doing, made complicated
issues legible for a popular audience.
Two factors facilitated the efforts of activists to translate court
rulings into compelling narratives of injustice. First, court rulings
and the logics that supported them were not legible to those
without legal training. Judicial decisions are “technical accounts”
as opposed to “stories” (Tilly 2006) and, as such, they are not
easily accessible to a lay audience by their very nature. This inac-
cessibility affords an opportunity for political entrepreneurs to
recast technical matters along stylized and emotive frames, pre-
senting competing narratives of injustice for public consumption.
A second factor that enabled political actors to effectively convey
strikingly different messages was media segmentation along ethno-
linguistic lines. Simply put, media segmentation facilitated the
compartmentalization of varied narratives. Although English is the
common language for most educated and urbanized Malaysians,
the vernacular press is divided between Chinese, Tamil, and Malay
language media, each of which carried strikingly divergent cover-
age of the cases.
Before the Storm
The critical role of political activists in drawing the public’s
attention is underlined by the fact that there were dozens of
Article 121 (1A) cases in the first 16 years following the amend-
ment, but they received virtually no press coverage and they
remained under the political radar until Shamala v. Jeyaganesh.32
32 I examine the full body of Article 121 (1A) cases in other forthcoming work.
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Why did it take so long for these cases to reach the media
spotlight and what precipitated such a stark change in 2004?
There are several underlying contextual developments as well as
key triggers that brought the court cases to the front of public
consciousness.
Certainly one key development was the swiftly changing media
environment. The print media was docile through the 1990s as the
result of strict government controls.33 But the rapid proliferation
of digital media opened up new avenues for journalists and
new forums for public debate and deliberation.34 With one of the
highest Internet penetration rates globally, and the highest of any
Muslim-majority country, Malaysians increasingly took their politi-
cal frustrations to the keyboard. Malaysian civil society groups had
also become more numerous, organized, and active by the turn of
the millennium (Weiss 2006). Women’s groups included Sisters in
Islam, the All Women’s Action Society, the Women’s Aid Organiza-
tion (WAO), and the Women’s Center for Change (WCC). Human
rights groups included SUARAM. Religious organizations included
ABIM, Jamaah Islah Malaysia ( JIM), the Malaysian Consultative
Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism, and Taoism
(MCCBCHST), and a dozen others representing the different faith
communities in Malaysia. The heady days of the reformasi move-
ment also emboldened citizens to become more directly engaged in
political life. Finally, the “Islamic state debate” was heating up
between the ruling UMNO and its religious-oriented political rival,
PAS. UMNO went to great lengths to harness the legitimating
power of Islamic symbolism and discourse, but PAS also worked
hard to undercut UMNO’s position with constant charges that the
government had not done enough to advance “real” Islam. Not to
be outdone, Mahathir Mohammad declared that Malaysia was
already an Islamic state in 2001, precipitating perhaps the fiercest
round of one-upmanship between the ruling UMNO and PAS. For
the next decade, political activists of all stripes debated whether
Malaysia was meant to be an “Islamic state.” Such was the political
context when the Article 121 (1A) cases entered into popular politi-
cal discourse.
33 A central instrument of government control is the Printing Presses and Publications
Act, which applies to all print media including newspapers, books, and pamphlets. Section
3 of the Act provides the Internal Security Minister absolute discretion to grant and revoke
licenses, which are typically provided for only one year at a time and are subject to renewal.
Malaysia was ranked at a dismal 110 of 139 countries in the 2002 Press Freedom Index,
published by Reporters without Borders.
34 Online media have not been subject to the Printing Presses and Publications Act,
although the government has suggested that this may change.
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The Trigger
Shamala v. Jeyaganesh was the immediate trigger that brought
the Article 121 (1A) cases into national consciousness. The key
difference in Shamala v. Jeyaganesh was that Shamala’s attorney
made a concerted effort to generate public attention—an effort that
was facilitated by the rapidly changing environment of civil society
activism and digital media. Shamala’s attorney, Ravi Nekoo, was an
active member in the legal aid community and he was well net-
worked with a variety of rights organizations in Kuala Lumpur.
When Ravi Nekoo discovered that Shamala v. Jeyaganesh was not a
typical custody case, he turned to the most prominent women’s
rights groups in Kuala Lumpur: the WAO, the All Women’s
Action Society, the WCC, Sisters in Islam, and the Women Lawyers’
Association. He also turned to religious organizations, most
notably the Hindu Sangam, the Catholic Lawyers Society, and the
MCCBCHST. These groups took an immediate interest in the case
and they quickly gained formal observer status with the High
Court. Subsequently, they filed amicus curiae briefs and mobilized
their resources to bring public attention to the case.
The question of whether or not to “go public” posed a dilemma
for the groups because they were uncertain whether or not public
attention would work to their advantage. According to Ravi Nekoo,
“The initial view was that if the case became too big, it would
become a political issue and the courts would then succumb to
political pressure.”35 But after extensive deliberation, a decision
was made to go public, “. . . because prior to Shamala there were
so many other cases that just went nowhere.” Shortly thereafter,
women’s groups initiated a public awareness campaign and pro-
posed amendments to the Marriage and Divorce Act to protect
women’s rights in such circumstances. The day after the ruling in
Shamala v. Jeyaganesh, the Malaysia Hindu Sangam and the
MCCBCHST also went public, issuing press statements condemn-
ing the ruling.36 This was the first time that any case concerning the
contested civil/shariah court jurisdiction was covered in the leading
online news outlet, Malaysiakini. Several thousand more news
stories would be published about these cases over the course of the
next decade.
Liberal Rights Groups Mobilize
Liberal rights activists were increasingly alarmed at civil court
rulings on issues related to religion. Far from acting as the guar-
35 Interview with Ravi Nekoo, 18 February 2012.
36 “Religious leaders irked by decision on conversion case,” Malaysiakini, April 14,
2004.
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antor of fundamental liberties, the civil courts began to cede juris-
diction to the shariah courts anytime that Islam was at issue,
even when it was eminently clear that the fundamental rights of
non-Muslims were being harmed. As a direct result of Shamala v.
Jeyaganesh, liberal rights organizations formed a coalition named
“Article 11,” after the article of the Federal Constitution guarantee-
ing freedom of religion.37 The objective of the Article 11 coalition
was to focus public attention on the erosion of individual rights,
particularly in matters related to religion, and to “ensure that
Malaysia does not become a theocratic state.”38 Article 11 produced
a website, short documentary videos providing firsthand interviews
with non-Muslims who were adversely affected by Article 121 (1A),
analysis and commentary from their attorneys, and recorded
roundtables on the threat posed by Islamic law.
Liberal rights groups also proposed the establishment of an
“Interfaith Commission” composed of representatives of various
faith communities in Malaysia. Among other duties, the Commis-
sion would work to “advance, promote and protect every individu-
al’s freedom of thought, conscience and religion” by examining
complaints and making formal recommendations to the govern-
ment.39 But the explicit focus on individual rights rather than
communal rights immediately raised the ire of conservatives who
feared that the Commission would be used as a platform from
which the shariah courts would be challenged. These fears were
compounded by the fact that the principal organizer of the two-day
organizing conference was the Malaysian Bar Council, an organi-
zation that was hardly viewed as impartial in the disputes over court
jurisdiction. Moreover, as an Utusan Malaysia article highlighted
for its Malay readers, the main financial sponsor for the conference
was the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, a German research foun-
dation associated with the Christian Democratic Union Party of
Germany.40 Conservative NGOs spoke out loudly against the notion
of an interfaith commission. Rather than participate, conservative
groups went to the media to condemn the conference and to call on
the government to stop the proceedings.41 Media coverage only
37 The coalition included the Bar Council of Malaysia, AWAM, the National Human
Rights Society (HAKAM), Sisters in Islam, SUARAM, and the WAO. The Article 11 Coali-
tion also included the MCCBCHST, the umbrella organization representing the concerns of
non-Muslim religious communities in Malaysia.
38 Article 11 | The Federal Constitution: Protection for All. Available at: [Last accessed
March 2, 2011].
39 Draft Interfaith Commission of Malaysia Bill, Article 4 (1) (a).
40 Utusan Malaysia, Feb 28, 2005. “Jangan Cetuskan Isu Agama Elak Perbalahan Kaum”
[Do Not Spark Religious Issues; Avoid Racial Disputes]
41 See, for example, “Majlis Peguam Tidak Sensitif Kepada Kesucian Islam” [The Bar
Council is not Sensitive to the Sanctity of Islam] Harakah, Jan. 16–31 2005; “Pelbagai Pihak
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grew more intense after the conference, with conservatives drawing
attention to the prominent position of international law and indi-
vidual rights in the conference platform, and the implications that
this would have for Islamic law.42 In response to the furor, Prime
Minister Abdullah Badawi called on the Bar Council to cease dis-
cussion of the Interfaith Commission proposal.
As if to underline the threat to individual liberties that liberal
rights groups were concerned with, soon thereafter Lina Joy’s case
was rejected a second time in the Court of Appeals. Three months
later, Kaliammal Sinnasamy lost the right to give her husband a
Hindu burial. With both cases generating extensive news coverage,
9 out of 10 non-Muslim cabinet ministers in Prime Minister
Badawi’s government submitted a formal memorandum request-
ing the review and repeal of Article 121 (1A).43 It was an unprec-
edented move that stirred immediate protest from Muslim NGOs
and the Malay language press. Prime Minister Badawi responded
to public pressure by publicly rejecting the memorandum.
Badawi’s refusal to consider the problems generated by Article
121 (1A) did nothing to resolve the underlying legal conundrum.
Lina Joy was granted permission to approach the Federal Court,
the highest appeal court in Malaysia in April 2006, ensuring that
controversy over her case would remain in the news. The following
month, another conversion/child custody case hit the headlines.44
And, in July 2006, Siti Fatimah Tan Abdullah applied to convert out
of Islam. It had become painfully clear that each case would create
considerable controversy. The judicial system was hardwired to
continuously reproduce the same legal tensions. Worse still, pres-
sure from civil society groups was now making it more difficult for
the courts to solve the legal dilemmas by themselves.
The Article 11 coalition went on to organize a series of public
forums across Malaysia. The first forum in Kuala Lumpur entitled,
“The Federal Constitution: Protection for All” addressed the cases
of Lina Joy, Moorthy Maniam, and Shamala Sathiyaseelan among
others, highlighting the conflict of jurisdiction between the civil
Bantah Syor Tubuh Suruhanjaya Antara Agama” [Various Parties Oppose the Recommendation
of the Establishment of an Inter-Religious Commission] Utusan Malaysia, Feb 24, 2005;
“Kerajaan Perlu Bertegas Tolak Penubuhan IRC” [Government needs to be Firm in Rejecting
the Establishment of the IRC Harakah, Feb. 16–28 2005].
42 See, for example, “The IFC Bill: An Anti-IslamWish List” Baharuddeen Abu Bakar,
Harakah Daily, March 27, 2005.
43 New Straits Times, January 20, 2006. Additionally, the MCCBCHST sent a private
memo to the Prime Minister expressing grave concerns that the shariah courts
were impinging on the rights of non-Muslims. This was published under the title, “Respect
the Rights to Profess and Practice One’s Religion (2007).” See MCCBCHST (2007a,
2007b).
44 Subashini v. Saravanan.
790 The Construction of a Binary
courts and the shariah courts. The Article 11 coalition continued
with a nationwide road show, hitting Malacca in April, Penang in
May, and Johor Bahru in July 2006. The campaign submitted
a petition to the Prime Minister, signed by 20,000 concerned
Malaysians, calling on the government to affirm that “Malaysia shall
not become a theocratic state.”
But others saw it differently. Politicians and conservative NGOs
also saw advantage in framing these court cases as rights
problems—but not individual rights problems. Rather, the message
from conservative activists was that the rights of the Muslim com-
munity, and Islam itself, were under attack. PAS president, Abdul
Hadi Awang, used the Article 11 activities to his political advantage
at the PAS annual party convention in 2006. Opening the confer-
ence, Awang told party delegates that “Never before in the history
of this country has the position of Islam been as strongly challenged
as it is today.”45 Awang urged the government, Muslim NGOs, and
all Muslims to defend Islam in the face of Article 11 challenges.
Similarly, at the 2006 UMNO general assembly, delegates used the
issue as a way to brandish their religious credentials. Shabudin
Yahaya, an UMNO Penang delegate, railed that “[t]here are NGOs
like Interfaith Commission, Article 11 coalition, Sisters in Islam and
Komas who are supported and funded by this foreign body called
Konrad Adenauer Foundation.”46 Although the Article 11 forums
had been tremendously successful in generating media attention,
coverage in the Malay language press was not complementary.47
The Article 11 forums were depicted as a fundamental challenge
not only to the shariah courts, but to Islam itself. The Article 11
forum in Penang was disrupted by several hundred protesters with
posters reading, “Fight Liberal Islam,” “Don’t Seize our Rights,”
and “Don’t Insult God’s Laws.”48 Mohd Azmi Abdul Hamid, the
leader of Teras Pengupayaan Melayu and organizer of the protest
against the Article 11 forum in Penang, explained that the true
intent of liberal rights activists was to undermine the shariah courts:
“Under the pretext of human rights, they condemned Islamic
principles and the shariah courts. They have a hidden motive to
place the shariah laws beneath the civil laws.”49 When another
large protest gathered outside the next Article 11 forum in Johor
Bahru, the forum was stopped halfway through by police seeking to
maintain public order.
45 “PAS to Muslims: Close Ranks, Defend Islam” Malaysiakini, 7 June 2006.
46 “Muslims Face Threats fromWithin and Without,” Malaysiakini, 17 November 2006.
47 “Warning: Stop Questioning the Constitution” Berita Harian, July 25, 2006; “Never
Question Article 121 (1A)” Utusan Malaysia, July 24, 2006.
48 Malaysiakini, May 15, 2006.
49 Malaysiakini, June 5, 2006.
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Conservative NGOs Mobilize
Liberal rights groups were not the only organizations to mobi-
lize. A more formidable countermobilization was underway in the
name of defending Islam. A group of lawyers calling themselves
“Lawyers in Defense of Islam” (Peguam Pembela Islam) held a press
conference to announce their formation at the Federal Territory
Shariah Court Building on 13 July 2006. Their explicit aim was to
“take action to defend the position of Islam” in direct response to
the activities of Article 11. A few days later, a broad array of Muslim
NGOs united under a coalition calling itself, “Muslim Organiza-
tions for the Defense of Islam” (Pertubuhan-Pertubuhan Pembela
Islam), or PEMBELA (Defenders) for short. PEMBELA brought
together over 50 Islamic organizations including ABIM, JIM, the
Shariah Lawyers’ Association of Malaysia (PGSM), and the Muslim
Professionals Forum.50 Their founding statement explains that
their immediate motivation for organizing was the Moorthy
Maniam and Lina Joy cases as well as challenges to “the position of
Islam in the Constitution and the legal system of this country”
(PEMBELA 2006a). Underlining their extensive grassroots base,
PEMBELA gathered a maximum-capacity crowd of 10,000 sup-
porters at the federal mosque in Kuala Lumpur and issued a
“Federal Mosque Resolution” outlining the threat posed by liberal
rights activists (PEMBELA 2006b). The following day, PEMBELA
sent an open letter to the Prime Minister and the press, reiterating
the threat that recent court cases posed to Islam and to the shariah
courts:
Since Independence 49 years ago, Muslims have lived in religious
harmony with other religions. Now certain groups and individu-
als have exploited the climate of tolerance and are interfering as
to how we Muslims should practice our religion.
They have used the Civil Courts to denigrate the status of Islam as
guaranteed by the Constitution. There are concerted attempts to
subject Islam to the Civil State with the single purpose of under-
mining the Shariah Courts. The interfaith groups and the current
Article 11 groups are some of the unwarranted attempts to attack
Islam in the name of universal human rights. (PEMBELA 2006c)
In nearly all of this heated rhetoric, conservatives charged that
liberal rights posed a fundamental challenge to Islam and the
Shariah. In response to PEMBELA’s mobilization, Prime Minister
Badawi issued an executive order that all Article 11 forums should
be stopped.
50 Pembela later grew to encompass the activities of over 70 Muslim NGOs.
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The International Dimension
By 2006, the Lina Joy case was not only a national issue. It
received widespread coverage in the international press. Promi-
nent outlets such as the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the
Washington Post, the Guardian, the BBC, the International Herald
Tribune, The Economist, Time magazine, and dozens of others covered
the Joy case. Liberal rights activists were eager to share the story
with the international press in the hope that outside pressure on
the Malaysian government would work where domestic activism
had failed. Hungry for such stories, the international press was
happy to oblige.51
Liberal rights activists also leveraged international pressure in
other ways. In litigation, lawyers for Lina Joy made extensive ref-
erence to international law and the international human rights
conventions signed by the Malaysian government. Moreover, they
accepted legal assistance from a U.S.-based NGO, the Becket Fund
for Religious Liberty. Not only did the Becket Fund submit an
amicus curiae brief to the Federal Court of Malaysia, but they
testified before the U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus
about the Lina Joy case and the threat to individual rights in
Malaysia (Becket Fund 2005).52 The United States Department of
State also focused attention on Lina Joy and other cases in their
International Religious Freedom Report (2000–2010). Likewise,
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights made multiple
inquiries at the request of Malaysian rights organizations (2006,
2008, 2009). The Commission repeatedly reminded the Malaysian
government of their obligations under international law.
This internationalization of the Lina Joy case proved to be a
strategic misstep for liberal rights activists. Although liberal rights
supporters viewed their strategies as entirely legitimate and com-
pelling, they fit perfectly with the opposing narrative that Western
powers seek to undermine Islam in Malaysia. What better proof of
Western interference in Malaysian affairs could be offered than the
hundreds of Western newspaper articles that covered the plight of
Lina Joy at the hands of the shariah courts? And what better proof
of Western interference could be offered than regular criticisms in
the annual U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports and the
U.S. State Department International Religious Freedom Reports
regarding infringements on religious liberty in Malaysia? Liberal
51 And thus the shariah versus individual rights binary was circulated internationally,
affirming popular understandings abroad that liberal rights and Islam are fundamentally
at odds with one another.
52 The Becket Fund’s involvement was noted and criticized in a Harakah article “Agensi
Amerika didakwa beri sokongan sepenuhnya kepada Lina Joy” [American Agency Accused of
Giving Full Support to Lina Joy] Harakahdaily, 15 August 2006.
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rights activists were slow to realize that all three of their primary
strategies (litigation, consciousness-raising public events, and
appeals to international support and international law) provided
conservatives with more ammunition to claim that Islam was under
siege.
In the lead-up to the final Federal Court judgment in Joy v.
Islamic Religious Council of the Federal Territories, conservative NGOs
organized dozens of public forums and flooded the Malay language
press with hundred more articles and opinion pieces on the need to
defend Islam and to confront liberal rights activists, particularly
those “liberal Muslims” who posed an insidious threat to the ummah
from within.53 Demonstrating their grassroots support, PEMBELA
submitted a 700,000-signature petition to the Prime Minister on 29
September 2006, dwarfing the 20,000 signatures that Article 11 was
able to muster. No doubt, the two-hour meeting between conser-
vative NGO leaders and the Prime Minister a few months later was
the result of this ability to mobilize such broad-based support.
The Federal Court of Malaysia issued its highly anticipated
ruling on 30 May 2007, dismissing Joy’s petition. Conservative
NGOs were satisfied with the decision, but liberal rights groups54
and organizations representing non-Muslim communities in
Malaysia were outraged.55 Rather than resolving the liberal rights
versus Islamic law binary, the Lina Joy ruling simply confirmed the
popular understanding that Islam and liberal rights could not
coexist; instead, one would inevitably dominate the other. Not only
did popular discourse continue along the same lines in the aftermath
of the ruling, but brand-new cases emerged along the lines of the
three cases examined in this article, ensuring that the binary is
constantly reproduced in public discourse.56
53 Harakah Daily, for example, ran an article with the headline “Lina Joy’s Case is a
Planned Effort to Undermine Islam.” “Kes Lina Joy Usaha Terancang Hapuskan Islam”
Harakahdaily, 15 July 2006.
54 See Aliran media statement, “Lina Joy Verdict: No Freedom, No Compassion” (30
May 2007); Women’s Aid Organization, All Women’s Action Society, and Sisters in Islam
statement, “Constitutional Right to Freedom of Belief Made Illusory” (31 May 2007);
Malaysian Bar Council press statement, “Federal Constitution Must Remain Supreme” (31
May 2007); and SUARAM press statement (31 May 2007).
55 See Malaysia Hindu Sangam press statement (30 May 2007); Christian Federation of
Malaysia press statement (30 May 2007); Council of Churches of Malaysia press statement
(30 May 2007); Catholic Lawyer’s Society Press statement (6 June 2007); Malaysian Con-
sultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism, and Taoism press release
(19 June 2007).
56 A new conversion/custody case involving a woman by the name of Indira Gandhi
mirrors the circumstances of Shamala v. Jeyaganesh. Similarly, a new “bodysnatching” case
over the burial of Mohan Singh mirrored the circumstances of the Moorthy Maniam case.
Finally, the Priyathaseny case, currently in the courts, mirrors many of the circumstances in
the Lina Joy case.
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This chain of events clearly illustrates the radiating effect that
the court rulings had on civil society activism. The rulings gave
new energy and focus to variously situated civil society groups,
both liberal and conservative, and even catalyzed the formation of
entirely new NGOs and coalitions of NGOs—most notably, Article
11 and PEMBELA. The work of these NGOs, in turn, played a
direct role in shaping a political context that increasingly con-
strained the courts and government. Without a doubt, the dynamic
was one of polarization, making it harder for both the government
and the courts to find pragmatic solutions.
The power of the resulting binary is illustrated by the fact that
Sisters in Islam, a women’s rights organization that explicitly works
to advance women’s rights (and liberal rights more generally)
through the framework of Islamic law, proved unable to negotiate
a “middle way.” Instead, Sisters in Islam assumed a leadership
position in the Article 11 coalition and was portrayed by conserva-
tive detractors as “Sisters against Islam.” Similarly, on the other
side of the spectrum, conservative NGOs that occupied a wide
range of positions on various issues—from ABIM to the Muslim
Professionals Forum—found themselves working in cooperation
under PEMBELA.
The Binary in Popular Legal Consciousness
In order to examine the extent to which this binary discourse
shaped popular legal consciousness, I assembled a multiethnic
Malaysian research team to conduct 100 semi-structured interviews
with “everyday Malaysians” in the summer and fall of 2009.57 These
interviews were further supplemented by a national survey.58 Both
sets of data suggest that public understandings of the court cases
were conditioned by the intense political spectacle that accompa-
nied them.
The controversies surrounding the Article 121 (1A) cases were
not understood by most in the Malay community as the result of
57 Interviews were conducted by the author and the team of research assistants at a
variety of locales in Kuala Lumpur. Interviews were conducted in Bahasa Malaysia,
Chinese, English, and Tamil in the neighborhoods of Kampung Baru, Kampung Kirinchi,
Subang Jaya, Brickfields, Seri Kembangan, Shah Alam, and Bangsar, each of which repre-
sent different ethnic composition and varying levels of socioeconomic affluence. While this
set of interviews does not provide a statistically representative sample of the Malaysian
public, they were supplemented by a cross-national survey.
58 The national survey used a sampling frame that ensured the respondents repre-
sented the Malaysian Muslim community across relevant demographic variables including
region, sex, and urban-rural divides. The random stratified sample of 1043 Malaysian
Muslims ensured a maximum error margin of ± 3.03 percent at a 95% confidence level. For
more on the survey methodology, see Moustafa (2013a: 179).
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institutional problems related to legal standing or lacunas in the
law. Nor were the legal conundrums understood as a product of
the state’s strict regulation of racial and religious difference. On
the contrary, the controversies were understood by most Malay
Muslims as the result of too little regulation of religion and bold
attempts by non-Muslims to undermine Islam. Muslim respondents
almost all spoke of Islam being “the religion of the country” and
expressed the view that the Muslim community must be allowed to
govern its own affairs without interference from the civil courts.
Sixty-two percent of Muslim respondents agreed with the state-
ment that the cases were “examples of efforts by some individuals
and groups to undermine Islam and the Shariah Courts in
Malaysia” as compared with only eight percent of non-Muslims
who shared that view.
As one interviewee explained, the legal controversies came
about, “because we don’t have full implementation of the shariah
law here in Malaysia.” The same interviewee further explained
that, “we claim that we are an Islamic country but our shariah law
is still not that strong. If we don’t strengthen shariah law we will
be weakened and they [non-Muslims] will be able to overrule us
[Muslims] using the civil court.” This view, which reflected the
mind-set of many in the Malay community, pointed to: (1) an
immediate threat, (2) a diagnosis of the problem, and (3) a solution.
The immediate threat was that non-Muslims “will be able to over-
rule us,” the diagnosis of the problem was that “shariah law is still
not that strong,” and the solution: “full implementation of shariah
law.” The claim by conservative NGOs that the cases were deliber-
ate strategies designed to undermine Islam and the shariah courts
appears to have been an effective frame. These understandings had
little to do with the legal conundrums that generated the cases, but
they matched the frames of meaning provided by conservative
groups almost one to one.
It is important to note, however, that Malays were not uniform
in their understanding of these cases. Thirty percent of Malay
respondents held that converts to Islam should not be able to
convert children without spousal approval and the same portion of
Malay respondents believed that the civil court (not the shariah
court) was the proper legal forum to address such disputes. Simi-
larly, 20 percent ofMuslim respondents argued that Lina Joy should
not have to seek permission or certification from a shariah court to
change her official religious status. These respondents tended to
have a better understanding of the details and ambiguities of the
court cases. They also tended not to view the cases as efforts by
groups and individuals to challenge Islam and the shariah courts.
Whereas the majority of Muslims tended to understand the
cases as bold attempts by non-Muslims to undermine Islam in
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Malaysia, the starting point for non-Muslims was their rights vis-à-
vis the Malay community and a sense of powerlessness vis-à-vis the
government. Not surprisingly, every non-Muslim who was inter-
viewed believed that an injustice had befallen Shamala, Gandhi,
and other women in the same predicament when their husbands
converted their children and claimed custody in the shariah courts.
Like their Malay counterparts, Indian and Chinese Malaysians
tended not to attribute the cases to ambiguities and contradictions
built into the Malaysian legal system. But unlike their Malay coun-
terparts, they attributed the outcome to a broader trend of institu-
tional discrimination against non-Muslims in Malaysia. The cases
were understood in relation to a whole array of long-standing
political and economic grievances in the Indian and Chinese
communities. In discussions of the conversion/custody cases,
for example, respondents frequently commented on the economic
advantages that Malays enjoyed at the expense of non-Muslim
Indians and Chinese. Without prompting, respondents vented
their frustration that Malays enjoyed access to lucrative govern-
ment contracts, reduced prices for housing, government scholar-
ships for study at home and abroad, reserved spaces at universities,
and many other benefits. So while Malays viewed the significance of
the cases as an attack on Islam and the jurisdiction of the shariah
courts, non-Malays viewed the cases as a further manifestation of
Malay Muslim dominance over religious and ethnic minorities.
And just as most Muslim respondents understood the cases as
constituting a threat to the Muslim community, Chinese and Indian
Malaysians viewed these cases as constituting a fundamental(ist)
threat to their own communities. The cases were clearly at the front
of people’s minds.
Not only were most Indian and Chinese respondents familiar
with the cases, but interviewees frequently cited the cases as evi-
dence of discrimination before we had the opportunity to initiate discus-
sion. The first substantive interview question was “how do you
see the state of religious and race relations in the country today?”
But before proceeding to the next question, respondents offered
detailed descriptions of the injustice meted out to Shamala,
Gandhi, and others as examples to support their assessment of
poor ethnic and religious relations in Malaysia. Similarly, when we
initiated discussion of specific cases such as Gandhi v. Pathamanathan
and Joy v. Islamic Religious Council midway through the interview,
respondents frequently referenced analogous cases that had been
covered heavily in the press, including Kaliammal v. Islamic Religious
Council, Subashini v. Saravanan, and others.59 The frequency in
59 Typically, respondents could not recall the names of the cases, but they were
nonetheless eager to explain that there were many similar cases.
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which this occurred suggests that the Article 121 (1A) cases were
highly salient among “everyday Malaysians.”
Despite these alternate understandings across ethnic and reli-
gious lines, the vast majority of respondents, Muslim and non-
Muslim alike, agreed that the cases were deeply consequential for
the future of Malaysia. Eighty-five percent of Muslim respondents
and 80 percent of non-Muslim respondents reported that they
had strong views about the outcome of the cases. Another shared
assumption was that the legal tensions reflected a basic incompat-
ibility between Islam and liberal rights.60 One of the most troubling
findings from the nationwide survey was the response to the ques-
tion, “Are the Malaysian Constitution and the Shariah compatible
or incompatible with one another?” Nearly half of Muslim respon-
dents (45.5 percent) replied that they are incompatible.61 And
among the respondents who believed the Constitution and the
Shariah to be incompatible, an overwhelming 80.2 percent believed
that the Shariah should be the final authority above the Constitu-
tion. Although no comparable data exist from the 1990s, I suspect
that not nearly as large a segment of the Malaysian public would
have understood the Federal Constitution and the Shariah as
incompatible prior to the Article 121 (1A) cases.
The liberal rights versus shariah binary clearly exacerbated
political cleavages in Malaysia and, to some degree, shifted the
principal political cleavage from race to religion. Malaysian politics,
long defined by Malay, Chinese, and Indian parties, became
increasingly polarized along its main religious cleavage, between its
Muslim and non-Muslim communities. A second major outcome,
after the first, was a marked decline in perceptions of state legiti-
macy among non-Muslims. For the first time in 50 years, the
Barisan Nasional ruling coalition lost its supermajority in the 2008
parliamentary elections. Most telling was dwindling support from
the Chinese and Indian (primarily non-Muslim) communities as
reflected in the poor performance of the Chinese and Indian com-
ponent parties of the ruling coalition. Compared with the 2004
parliamentary elections, the Malaysian Chinese Association lost
over half of its parliamentary seats and the Malaysian Indian
60 It is important to note, however, that a significant number of Malay, Indian, and
Chinese respondents were cynical about how legal conundrums were used to advance
political agendas. One respondent explained, “You know how they say that sex always sells
in the business world? Well, it’s religion that sells when it comes to politics [in Malaysia].”
Yet, despite such political savvy among some respondents, the interviews strongly suggest
that the majority of the Malaysian public had internalized the frames of reference that had
reduced complex legal issues to the simple liberal rights versus Islamic law binary.
61 An almost equal portion of Muslim respondents, 44.9 percent, replied that the
Constitution and the Shariah are compatible and the remaining nine percent responded,
“Do not know.”
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Congress lost a stunning two-thirds of its seats.62 This was in no
small part due to the grave concerns about the legal rights of the
non-Muslim community.
Conclusions
Tracing the full life cycle of these cases, both in the courts and
beyond, reveals how the binary understanding of liberal rights
versus Islamic law is constantly inscribed in Malaysian political
discourse and in popular legal consciousness. Ironically, the legal
conundrums in each of the cases had little to do with the Islamic
legal tradition. Rather, matters related to court jurisdictions and
rules of standing generated legal dilemmas that the courts were
unable to resolve by themselves and that the government was
unwilling to address. The long string of Article 121 (1A) cases
remained unknown to the Malaysian public for a full 16 years, until
they were brought into the media spotlight by political activists—
liberals and conservatives alike—who advanced competing frames
of understanding. Taken from the court of law and deployed in the
court of public opinion, these legal controversies assumed a differ-
ent character altogether. Political entrepreneurs, particularly those
on the conservative side of the divide, were not interested in the
technical details of the cases. Quite the opposite, they mobilized
around the cases to advance much more expansive rights claims
and narratives of injury. Complex legal problems were thus trans-
formed into compelling narratives of injustice and redeployed in
the public sphere. The 121 (1A) rulings gave new energy and focus
to variously situated civil society groups, catalyzed the formation of
entirely new NGOs, and provided a focal point for political mobi-
lization outside of the courts. In turn, this mobilization increasingly
constrained both the courts and the government.
These dueling injustice frames were mutually constitutive. Both
sides derived power, legitimacy, and purpose from their opposi-
tional stance vis-à-vis the other. Liberal activists were blind or indif-
ferent to the fact that the rights conceptions they deployed could
not accommodate communal conceptions of rights. Nor did con-
servative activists care to consider the way that religious authority
had been legally constructed in Malaysia and what a significant
departure those institutional formations are from the classical
Islamic legal tradition. The dueling binaries of liberal rights versus
the shariah, individual rights versus collective rights, and the
62 The MCA dropped from 31 seats in the 2004 election to 15 in 2008. The MIC
dropped from nine seats in the 2004 election to three seats in 2008. In terms of the popular
vote, the MCA lost 33 percent and the popular vote for the MIC fell 31 percent.
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secular versus religious nature of the state were all constructed and
contingent on particular institutional and political circumstances.
Yet, the power of this construction, as with all others, is that its own
starting point is obfuscated. The construct diverts attention away
from its institutional source and, to the extent that it becomes
enmeshed in wider political struggles, it becomes further rooted in
popular legal consciousness.
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